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Rethinking Greed
Jason Kawall
Greed is often thought to be a particularly common and troubling vice 
in contemporary, market-driven societies.1 The negative effects of greed 
seem wide-ranging and severe: environmental harms afflicting current 
generations of humans (and nonhumans), exploitation of workers across 
the world, weakened communities, a turning away of the greedy them-
selves from genuine self-improvement and well-being, and, perhaps most 
important for present purposes, potentially devastating impacts upon 
future generations. With climate change—largely driven by growing 
human consumption—future generations face drastically changing eco-
systems, massive species loss, radically changing regional climates, 
extreme weather systems, coastal flooding and erosion, and still further 
adverse impacts. Moral burdens are being placed on future generations 
that will need to make difficult, possibly tragic decisions in the face of 
a radically changed world.
Those wealthy by global standards, in particular, may seem to exhibit 
greed in their ongoing demand for a wide range of goods. They seem to 
be key drivers of the consumption that is fuelling potentially devastating 
environmental changes. Yet we might wonder whether the majority of 
the globally wealthy are, in fact, greedy; after all, the common image of 
the greedy person is of one who is obsessed with getting more material 
goods, or of the miser counting his coins. Are we really like this?
In what follows I attempt to clarify the nature of the vice of greed, 
focusing on what can be called “modest greed.” Agents who are modestly 
greedy do not long for material goods or wealth with intense desires. 
Rather, they have quite modest desires, but ones whose satisfaction they 
pursue excessively relative to other goods. Modest greed will emerge as 
a particularly troubling vice for those facing a changing world—one that 
will require us to reassess our actions, our beliefs, and our understanding 
of the virtues.
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Defining Greed
Greed is a vice of disproportionality: greedy agents pursue objects to a 
degree that is disproportionate to their value relative to other goods that 
the agents could be pursuing, or to the harms associated with their 
pursuit.2 For example, there is pleasure and value in enjoying a doughnut, 
but the greedy person desires doughnuts disproportionately to other 
valuable goods, such as his health. Similarly, a pursuit of wealth in itself 
need not be greedy, for wealth has positive instrumental value. But when 
an agent pursues wealth to the detriment of the goods of friendship, the 
development of other interests and talents, or even moral constraints, her 
pursuit becomes greedy.
There can be greed for most any good. Thus, we could speak of being 
greedy for praise or for knowledge insofar as we can pursue such goods 
excessively relative to other goods. But our discussion will focus on para-
digmatic cases of greed, those with material goods or wealth as their 
objects.
Consider, then, the following account of greed with respect to a given 
good. Intuitively, the account can be seen as divided into two parts: 
clauses (1) through (3) capture the excessive pursuit of objects definitive 
of greed, while clauses (4) and (5) capture greed’s broader manifestations 
in our attitudes and actions:
One is greedy with respect to a good or set of goods to the extent that 
one (1) excessively pursues this good or set of goods, or would do so in 
relevant conditions, due to either (2a) a vicious overvaluation of, or 
excessive desire for, these goods, or (2b) a vicious lack of concern with, 
or undervaluation of other goods or harms, and (3) to the degree that 
this pursuit is aimed at securing these goods for oneself; one is also 
greedy to the extent that one (4) possesses inappropriate attitudes that 
manifest a vicious overvaluation of (or excessive desire for) these goods, 
and (5) acts or would act in relevant conditions on the attitudes in (4).
Take clauses (1) and (2). With respect to clause (1), pursuit of a good 
can involve devoting time, money, and other resources toward acquisi-
tion of a good or set of goods, and would include successful acquisi-
tion itself.3 Clauses (2a) and (2b) focus on the factors that lead to 
the excessive pursuit described in (1). Intuitively, greed involves irre-
sponsibly overestimating the value of the good pursued, or downplay-
ing/ignoring alternative goods, or the harms associated with pursuing 
the good.
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For example, an agent may tend in general to enjoy material goods 
of some particular kind, and thus tend to form beliefs that—conveniently 
enough—suggest that such goods are of greater value than they actually 
are. Other cases may involve envy, as when an agent sees others possess-
ing a good, and comes to value this good excessively precisely because 
others possess it. In each case, the greedy overvaluation is a result of a 
culpably irresponsible judgment of a material good’s value. The other 
possibility is that one ignores or undervalues other goods or harms in 
an epistemically irresponsible fashion. Thus, out of sloth one might fail 
to investigate the negative impacts of one’s consumption on the environ-
ment, or only engage in a superficial assessment. Apathy might lead one 
to fail to evaluate the value of rival goods, or to ignore important harms 
associated with pursuing a given material good, leaving one with a com-
paratively excessive valuation of the material good as a default.4
Now take clause (3). Greed involves excessively pursuing goods for 
oneself. Imagine a person who devotes herself to acquiring material 
goods, but simply in order to give them all away to friends and charities 
while she lives in a tiny, rundown apartment. Such an agent may exces-
sively pursue material goods, and underestimate the value of her own 
well-being, but certainly this does not seem to be a matter of greed. Greed 
requires self-centeredness.
With respect to the second half of the definition, in clause (4) we are 
concerned with an agent’s tendencies toward inappropriate attitudes that 
manifest greed, where an attitude toward an object manifests greed to 
the extent that it is a result of vicious overvaluations of or excessive 
desires for given goods or sets of goods.5 Thus a thief in prison might 
exhibit greed in constantly thinking about various goods he wants, even 
if he cannot take effective steps to acquire them. One’s excessively strong 
desires for a good might lead to a slight—but still inappropriate—
downplaying of the importance of one’s community, of helping others, 
and so on. Greed manifests itself in our attitudes toward other objects, 
not only the immediate objects of our desires.
The final clause, (5), concerns the extent to which an agent acts on 
the attitudes described in (4), or would so act in relevant circumstances. 
Thus we might have two greedy agents who have come to resent demands 
of charitable giving, given their overvaluation of some material good. 
One agent still gives, even if grudgingly. But the other begins to reduce 
or even stop giving—and would do so in a wide range of similar circum-
stances. It seems that the latter agent is greedier than the former. Or 
similarly, agents could be greedy to the extent that they resent paying 
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taxes (insofar as this detracts from their excessive pursuit of various 
goods)—they are greedier still when this would lead them to cheat on 
their taxes.
With this in hand, we can characterize an agent’s overall greediness 
as follows:
The extent to which one is greedy (overall) is a function of (1) the number 
of goods or sets of goods with respect to which one is greedy, (2) the 
depth or extent of one’s greed with respect to these goods, and also (3) 
the extent to which one possesses inappropriate attitudinal dispositions 
that manifest greed, and (4) the extent to which one acts upon (or would 
act upon in relevant circumstances) the attitudes in (3).
The first two clauses are straightforward, and capture the idea that 
one’s overall greed is largely a function of one’s greed toward various 
goods. The more goods with respect to which you are greedy, and the 
greater the depth of your greed for these goods, the greedier you are, 
overall. The third and fourth clauses reflect the fact that an agent’s greed 
with respect to various goods can manifest itself in attitudes and actions 
toward rival goods. Again, for example, a person might begin to resent 
charitable giving because it takes away money that she wishes to use for 
her excessive pursuits. Finally, being greedy is a matter of degree, and in 
its weakest forms it is best understood as simply a limitation to one’s 
temperance or overall virtue. In its more severe forms it becomes a full-
fledged vice.6
To summarize this discussion, we can consider in table 11.1 an 
extended example of a man who is greedy for an SUV, indicating how 
each of the criteria (1) through (5) for greed might be satisfied.
Note that all of the preceding factors are matters of degree (and so 
the man’s level of greediness with respect to the SUV would also vary), 
and that the precise sources and manifestations of his greed could vary; 
this is simply one example.7
Modest Greed
Where does the definition lead us? I hope to a subtler picture of greed, 
one that illuminates both why the globally wealthy may in fact be greedy 
even when not obsessive about wealth or status, and why greed will be 
an especially problematic vice for future generations.
A common assumption about greed is that greedy individuals experi-
ence desires that are excessive with respect to their felt intensity. Thus in 
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dictionary definitions we find such terms as “inordinate or insatiate,” 
“intense,” and “rapacious.”8 And for many obvious instances of greed, 
this may well be true. Even so, with this assumption it becomes far too 
easy for most of us to brush worries aside. “I care far more about my 
family than I do about material things, fame, or wealth. I mean sure, 
they’re nice, but I have things in proper perspective. I’m glad I’m not one 
of these materialistic, greedy people.” But, as our definition makes clear, 
we can desire and strive for what is excessive for us, even if the felt 
intensity is quite modest. We might set ourselves a goal of buying a large 
house in the suburbs without our desire being aptly described as “intense” 
or “rapacious.” Yet this could still be greedy behavior on our part.
A second common assumption about greed is that it involves desires 
for, and a pursuit of, objects that are themselves inherently excessively 
luxurious or expensive. Thus when some think of greedy individuals, 
they think of people set on SUVs, mansions, jewelry, money, and so on. 
While the first common assumption posits excessively intense desires, the 
second assumption posits excessive objects of desire. And again, with 
closer examination we find that this needs to be reconsidered. Peter Wenz 
writes: “Consumer society cultivates greed, the unlimited desire for more. 
Without greed consumer demand would flag, the economy would slump, 
and people would lose their jobs. Avarice, an inordinate desire for wealth, 
Table 11.1
Clause Example (of a man who is greedy with respect to an SUV)
(1) He begins working overtime, cutting back on family activities and 
spending, and so on, in order to pursue the purchase of an SUV.
(2a) He excessively desires this SUV because he lets himself be swept 
away by advertisements, and is jealous of his neighbor who recently 
bought a similar new vehicle.
(2b) He never really questions whether his family actually needs this new 
SUV, or whether a smaller, more efficient vehicle would be viable.
(3) While he sometimes tries to rationalize his desire for the SUV in 
terms of looking after his family, what ultimately drives him is his 
desire to be seen in a top-of-the line new vehicle—it’s for him.
(4) He comes to resent spending time with his child when he is 
exhausted after his long workdays, and questions whether he really 
needs to contribute “so much” to charities—money that could 
instead go toward the SUV purchase.
(5) Finally, he might actually start giving less to charities because he now 
sees them simply as wasting money, and also spend much less time 
with his child due to his changed attitudes in (4).
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is implied by greed. People who want more and more of what money 
can buy desire unlimited amounts of money” (2005, 206).
Wenz presumably does not intend this statement as a strict definition, 
but still it reflects and reinforces the image of greed as involving unlim-
ited desires for excessive  items;9 similarly with his characterization of 
avaricious people desiring unlimited amounts of money. But greed is 
typically far more modest than having unlimited wants (in any strong 
sense) for material goods and wealth; to think in these terms might lead 
us to overlook most instances of greed. One could be greedy for a yacht 
and endlessly more, but one could equally be greedy with respect to such 
things as clothes, shoes, or the latest electronics (and even when the 
relevant desires are limited or finite).
A person’s life can be shaped by excessively pursuing goods that seem 
quite modest in themselves. Such a pursuit can result in lost opportuni-
ties—to instead give the money involved to environmental groups or 
other organizations, to spend time engaged in other rewarding activities, 
and so on. That is, the pursuit might not cause harm in itself, but can 
still be problematic by leading an agent to miss out on much better uses 
of the same resources. Beyond this, such excessive pursuit often causes 
harms—the production and disposal of most electronics involve signifi-
cant amounts of toxic chemicals, there are environmental costs to ship-
ping goods around the world, and so forth.
A person’s overall pursuit or desire for material goods can be rele-
vantly excessive even if each individual desire or pursuit of a good (and 
each good), taken in isolation, seems modest. Consider a middle-class 
American who regularly drives to the mall, and buys a shirt here, a DVD 
there, foods imported from around the world, and so on. Each individual 
desire and pursuit seems mild enough, but when we look at the cumula-
tive effect, it is what we would expect of a greedy person. This agent is 
still having comparatively large impacts on the environment. She is still 
encouraging ongoing shipping of goods across the world (with the associ-
ated carbon emissions and other impacts), devoting more land to growing 
cash crops (with the associated loss of habitat or local subsistence crops), 
and so on. Indeed, her environmental impacts could well be worse than 
those of the person who lives an otherwise ascetic life while saving for 
a yacht. Much of the consumption of the globally wealthy seems to arise 
out of such apparently mild desires, often as a mere habit, a diversion.
Notice that people who attempt to be frugal (voluntarily) can often 
be greedy in this seemingly modest way. They may buy the cheapest 
goods they can find, even if they do not buy much. While they might not 
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be spending much money and are not concerned with luxuries, they still 
cannot be bothered with how various products came to be so cheap. 
Some of them may suspect that workers have been exploited in some 
developing nation, or that poor environmental practices were involved, 
but this does not stop them; they may never investigate fully, or instead 
conveniently downplay their impacts. They are more concerned with 
acquiring goods cheaply than with moral or other concerns. This  is  a 
form of greed. Of course this is not to hold that those who cannot afford 
better alternatives are necessarily greedy (i.e., there is a difference between 
a voluntary cheapness and an imposed poverty).10 Rather, and particu-
larly for those who are wealthy, one must take responsibility for one’s 
purchases and investments, and the place that they hold in one’s life. If 
we focus only on instances of greed involving intensely felt desires for 
extreme wealth or obviously luxurious material goods we will overlook 
these far more common—and to that extent, far more troubling—forms 
of greed.
Must the alternative to such behaviors (and way of life, more broadly) 
be a life of comparative squalor and misery? We cannot enter into this 
issue in detail here, but note two important points. First, the citizens of 
many other wealthy nations have much smaller environmental impacts, 
and are hardly models of poverty. For example, as of 2009, the total 
ecological footprint per capita (in global hectares) for the United States 
has been estimated to be 9.02gha, while for Norway it is 4.20gha, for 
Germany it is 4.03gha, and for Sweden it is just 2.84gha (Ewing et al. 
2009, 57, 73). A significant reduction in environmental impacts for 
Americans thus seems viable, without a slide into poverty. Second, there 
is a growing literature in psychology (and related disciplines) suggesting 
that we tend to significantly overestimate how happy we will be made 
by acquiring material goods for ourselves, compared to pursuing other 
goods (see, e.g., Kasser 2002; Cafaro 2005; and Dunn, Aknin, and 
Norton 2008). To the extent that this literature is correct, a plausible 
case can be made that those excessively pursuing material goods are less 
happy than those pursuing other ends, and that a reduced pursuit of 
material goods need not adversely impact the happiness of the globally 
wealthy.11
Modest Greed in a World of Billions
We have seen that an agent’s pursuit of satisfying a set of desires can be 
greedy, even if the individual desires and pursuits seem quite modest. 
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These problems are compounded when multiple agents are acting, par-
ticularly with respect to justice. To mildly desire a second doughnut at a 
meeting and to take one may not seem excessive, but the situation 
changes if there are only a few doughnuts left and many colleagues who 
have not yet had anything to eat. A person who insists on taking a second 
doughnut in such circumstances is (barring some unusual justification) 
being greedy.
Now, note: in terms of felt intensity, the desire for a doughnut is likely 
to be quite mild; and a doughnut seems a modest object. But still, for 
example, if an agent culpably downplays his impacts (“They probably 
don’t want anything; and anyway, other people were taking doughnuts, 
too”), selfishly inflates his own claim to the good relative to others (“I’m 
hungry, and it’s not my fault they were too slow”), or simply never even 
so much as thinks of the others (a limiting case of irresponsibly ignoring 
harms and rival goods while focusing on satisfying our desire for a good), 
we have an instance of a greedy action.
An obvious analogy emerges here with our actions and our collec-
tive impact upon future generations in terms of species loss, resource 
depletion, using up sinks for carbon emissions, and so on. The cumula-
tive impact of large numbers of people—billions of us—satisfying appar-
ently mild desires for apparently modest goods can be devastating.12 
What may not be greedy in other circumstances (of low overall con-
sumption, low population, and enlightened technology) is now greedy, 
given current global conditions of growing populations and consump-
tion. Sometimes we culpably downplay our harmful impacts (“I’m sure 
there are lots of people who are environmentally far worse than I 
am—they’re the real problem”), we selfishly overemphasize our claim 
to various goods while ignoring the well-being of others (“I’ve worked 
for what I’ve got, and no one has the right to tell me how to live”), 
and so on; much more common still is simply for no thoughts of 
impacts on future generations to even cross our minds (see Bendik-
Keymer, this volume, on the vice of wantonness). This again qualifies 
as greedy behavior.
To properly understand and address greed, we need to recognize that 
we are on a world with billions of other people, and that there will be 
billions more after us. There are also billions of fellow mammals, birds, 
and other living things that share this planet with us, and those that will 
share the planet in the future (See Schlosberg, this volume, for an effort 
to extend a theory of climate justice to nonhuman entities). This is true 
for current generations, but will take on still greater importance over 
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decades to come as the human population reaches (and will likely remain 
close to) its peak on this planet. If each human thinks only in terms of 
her individual desires and pursuits of goods, each in isolation, she falls 
into a trap of self-centeredness, one that sustains greed. Instead we must 
look at our overall patterns of consumption as individuals and as com-
munities within the broader context of a massively consuming human 
population.
Derek Parfit writes:
Until this century, most of mankind lived in small communities. What each did 
could affect only a few others. But conditions have now changed. Each of us 
can now, in countless ways, affect countless other people. We can have real 
though small effects on thousands or millions of people. When these effects are 
widely dispersed, they may be either trivial, or imperceptible. It now makes a 
great difference whether we continue to believe that we cannot have greatly 
harmed or benefited others unless there are people with grounds for a serious 
complaint, or for gratitude. . . . For the sake of small benefits to ourselves, or 
our families, we may deny others much greater total benefits, or impose on others 
much greater total harms. We may think this permissible because the effects on 
each of the others will be either trivial or imperceptible. If this is what we think, 
what we do will often be much worse for all of us. (1984, 86; cited in Attfield 
2009, 229)
Parfit’s claims here are of a piece with the current proposal. But notice 
more explicitly the inverse of what Parfit stresses: when we act, we need 
to bear in mind that billions of other people are also acting, making 
trade-offs, and so forth. To act virtuously in a changed and changing 
world requires awareness of such broader contexts. (Compare Hirsch 
and Norton, chapter 16, this volume.)
Greed and Collective Action in a Changing World
For all this, we might wonder whether vices such as greed are truly at 
stake when we examine cases focusing on the presence and behaviors of 
others. Dale Jamieson raises the issue:
We should remind ourselves that while a great deal of environmentally destruc-
tive human behaviour can rightly be denounced as greedy or vicious, much is 
humdrum and ordinary. [. . . ] Many of our environmental problems have the 
structure of collective action problems. These involve many people making small 
contributions to very large problems. They do not intend to cause these problems, 
and in many cases feel quite powerless to prevent them. The “soccer mom” 
driving her kids to school, sporting events, and music lessons does not intend to 
change the climate. Yet, in a small way, that is exactly what she is doing. (2008, 
91–92)
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There is a worry, then, that many cases that we have treated as involving 
modest greed might instead be better understood as collective action 
problems.
The obvious immediate response here is that modest vices and virtues 
can be relevant to collective action problems. The more people pay atten-
tion to such problems, acknowledge their roles in contributing to them, 
are willing to cooperate, to act as needed, and so on, the better off we 
will be in trying to address them (compare Thompson, this volume, on 
a virtue of environmental responsibility). And of course to the extent that 
our values are skewed, that we downplay the importance of others, that 
we overvalue material goods, are reluctant to take action (or lack the 
willpower to do so), and so on, it will be more difficult to address col-
lective action problems.
Still, the worry persists—might our individual actions ultimately be 
ineffectual, and would this give us reason not to worry about modest 
greed? For example, should Claire boycott cheap products produced in 
environmentally unsound fashions, given that her actions alone are 
hardly likely to cause the manufacturers to cease production of such 
goods, or even to modify their procedures? Perhaps Claire would simply 
be making her own life more difficult while contributing almost nothing 
to solving the problems she is hoping to address; perhaps acting in a 
modestly greedy fashion would not be so problematic, after all.
There have been several compelling recent discussions of such ques-
tions concerning the effectiveness of individual actions, and whether we 
are obligated to engage in them.13 Broad themes that emerge from these 
discussions are that (1) individuals need to engage in social and political 
activity directed toward solving the problems they are seeking to 
address—purely private actions will typically have only smaller impacts 
(e.g., influencing friends and neighbors, perhaps helping to avoid charges 
of hypocrisy in calling for broader political changes), and (2) it is best 
for people to have characters that lead to appropriate actions (e.g., reduc-
ing misguided consumption, etc.) even if in isolation the individual 
actions do not seem to have significant impacts; an emphasis on the 
virtues is warranted.14
We can add several important considerations here. First, and perhaps 
most crucially, note that in morally assessing a person’s character and 
behaviors, far more is relevant than simply the effects of her actions. For 
example, we can properly negatively assess the character of a racist, even 
if his attitudes never manifest themselves in overt actions. Or suppose 
that the racist attempts to promote his views by regularly handing out 
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crude, simple-minded pamphlets that influence almost no one. We do not 
treat him or his actions as morally nonproblematic even if he has almost 
no impact in his efforts to promote hatred. Similarly, the character and 
actions of the mildly greedy can be seen as morally problematic, even if 
their actions have little overall impact.
Yet we can positively appraise an agent’s character and actions, even 
if the impacts of her actions seem quite modest. We can admire the gen-
erosity of a person living in poverty, even if she can only make very small 
contributions, given her circumstances. We can positively assess those 
who embrace and exhibit temperance and simplicity, even while their 
actions as individuals may have little impact on global problems.
To be virtuous requires a mindfulness of the larger context in which 
we live and act.15 That certain actions seem common and accepted in 
our society does not yet show them to be justified. When we reflect upon 
the demands of justice and benevolence, we see that, for many of us, our 
pursuit of many goods is excessive and greedy. Virtue requires recogniz-
ing changing circumstances; we are now in a world with a rapidly 
peaking population and growing consumption and waste. We cannot 
justify our actions by simply declaring that they are widely embraced, 
and individually seem to have little impact, any more than we can justify 
the actions and attitudes of a racist, even if his actions in isolation seem 
to have little adverse impact.
And second: when assessing our possible actions and their impacts, 
we should focus on those alternatives realistically available to us. For 
most of our actions there will be only small impacts, but within this 
range we can make choices. If we consume appropriately, locally grown 
food, for example, we encourage local producers and cut back on the 
distance at least some of our food must be transported. One way or 
another we must eat. But we often exhibit modest greed in buying 
cheaper products (with dubious origins) when we could viably make 
wiser, less harmful choices.
Modesty is required in assessing our actions. If we concern ourselves 
only with actions that are likely to have a direct, significant impact in 
solving large-scale collective action problems, it might seem that nothing 
is viable for us as ordinary people. Suppose you were, somehow, to 
obtain $10 million—an apparently large and significant sum. Even if 
you were to apply all of this money, it likely would have little direct 
impact on solving a global problem. Perhaps you could start influencing 
a few lawmakers in a few countries—but even here, this only goes so 
far, and it would depend on what other people were doing with other 
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lawmakers. Even the leaders of powerful nations will have only limited 
influence over other countries and international agreements. With such 
an approach, only a few people with extraordinary political, economic, 
or military power would have any reason to concern themselves with 
their impacts, as they would be the only ones with the direct power to 
effectively hope to address global collective action problems as individu-
als. But surely something has gone wrong if our understanding of ethics 
tells us that only a powerful few bear any responsibility for action in 
the face of large-scale problems in which we are all implicated, and 
that the rest of us can revel in greed, ignorance, and complacency as 
we see fit.
I think these points help to address a worry raised by Jeremy Bendik-
Keymer (chapter 13, this volume): that most globally wealthy people 
seem to be reasonably decent people, yet they are not terribly concerned 
with the current mass extinction event, or with climate change. Is it too 
demanding to ask decent people who are already focused on other good 
projects (and with limited time and money) to address climate change 
also? This is a difficult question, but the following seems fair. Even given 
current institutional structures and human limitations (of time, ability, 
and so on), most globally wealthy people should be more concerned with 
climate change than they are. While there are limits to what they can do, 
they can take much better advantage of the opportunities realistically 
available to them. This might require shifting at least some time and 
effort away from other projects, but given the potential scale of the harms 
at stake, a realignment of projects is surely in order. There are many 
exemplary individuals who are able to pursue a range of worthwhile 
projects while doing much more than others to attempt to address sig-
nificant environmental issues. While we cannot know everything and 
cannot act on behalf of every good cause, there is significant scope for 
most of us to make better decisions.16
More broadly, if we suspect that policy change at national and inter-
national levels will take significant time to achieve, we can at least take 
the local steps available to us. If we wait for change to come from inter-
national agreements, we (as individuals) will simply continue to “help” 
worsen the problems we face for years, in those small ways that are viable 
to ordinary people as we continue with our modest greed, waiting for 
change to come. If we worry about crossing various climate thresholds 
in the decades ahead, it seems foolish to continue to act as we do while 
waiting for agreements to be reached. Again: we can either try to do our 
best, or we can rest in modest greed.
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Some thinkers will return here to the importance of institutional and 
political factors while downplaying individual behaviors and character. 
Both Bendik-Keymer (chapter 13, this volume) and Vogel (chapter 15, 
this volume) seem tempted to do so. Vogel stresses that, with respect to 
many environmental issues, individuals are trapped in a “tragedy of the 
commons” scenario (see Hardin 1968) where any actions they take in 
isolation will do nothing to solve overall problems; if they consume less, 
others will consume more, and so on. To be sure, on the one hand, simply 
having individuals addressing their own modest greed will not be suffi-
cient for solving these problems. But on the other hand, if we do not 
address the character and actions of individual persons, from where do 
we expect political or institutional change to come? If there are no exem-
plars, will others believe that reduced consumption and other green 
changes are desirable or even viable? There seems to be an assumption 
that most of us tend to have good values, but cannot act on them viably, 
given current circumstances. But then why do people vote for politicians 
who deny the existence of climate change? Why do we fail so often to 
engage even in easily accessible green behaviors? It is not so obvious that 
we are simply good people trapped by bad institutions.
The globally wealthy (and others) may mean well, and be decent in 
some weak sense, but if we are still modestly greedy, apathetic, unin-
formed, and so on, there is little hope of political change. Even if a group 
of environmental lobbyists manages to have green legislation passed, if 
the public does not embrace these values or understand the importance 
of the issues, they can more than happily elect politicians who will 
weaken or repeal it. Certainly, institutional change is ultimately needed, 
but without informed, concerned, and virtuous individuals, such reform 
is unlikely to occur or to last. Here there can be a spiraling effect—if a 
large enough group manages to create institutional change, the attitudes 
of other individuals may change in response; with the new, broader 
support and change in attitudes, further institutional and political change 
may become viable, and so on. But individual character and action 
cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to such change.
A third consideration is relevant: we cannot be perfect, and our cir-
cumstances will shape the options open to us; as noted already, trade-offs 
will be necessary. Suppose a person needs to drive to work, given her 
particular circumstances. If so, she may need to think about compensat-
ing for this—to do so would reflect a recognition of the full costs of her 
actions (while a modestly greedy person would continue to enjoy the 
benefits of cheap gasoline while culpably ignoring or downplaying the 
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harms at stake). So she might buy local produce to cut back on other 
transportation required to sustain her existence, or she might give more 
time and money to environmental groups. We can allow ourselves some 
trade-offs in our actions, precisely because the individual impacts are 
typically so small (though we must keep in mind that billions of others 
are also acting and making trade-offs). But to be truly decent people, we 
need to reevaluate our projects and activities from time to time, to ensure 
that we are helping to address important issues.
And a fourth consideration: how then do we balance all of this—how 
do we choose acceptable trade-offs without allowing ourselves to slide 
into modest greed and other vices? Here no simple rules can be given—
but one plausible move involves an appeal to our integrity and ideals. 
Most of us strive to be certain kinds of people; we typically have ideals 
of compassion, justice, and so on that we can successfully express through 
our actions. So, for example, while it may be inconvenient to buy envi-
ronmentally sound goods, there are benefits to such actions—we will 
have at least some impact, even if minimal, and such actions would be 
in accordance with our ideals; we could also question whether we even 
need the goods at all. To ignore our ideals and values as we find them 
to be inconvenient will both lead to and reflect a lack of integrity and a 
drift into mild vice; these ideals are typically far more important than 
many of the other things with which we allow ourselves to become pre-
occupied in day-to-day life.
Conclusion
Given foreseeable global conditions, we need to shift from thinking of 
greed in terms of the objects pursued, or even the intensity of the desires 
for them, to instead looking at the costs of the pursuit in terms of justice 
and other goods—this is where the excessiveness lies. We each must ask: 
what are the impacts of my pursuit of various goods in current global 
conditions—what harms and benefits result, and what could I do other-
wise, what alternatives are there? What kind of person and character do 
my actions reflect? Recognition that now, and for generations to come, 
each of us will be one among several billion or more humans each 
shaping the world in small ways, will be crucial to our avoiding greed 
and other vices. We will need to think in terms of justice, both within 
and across generations, moving away from a narrow concern with our 
immediate neighbors and ourselves. It is our thoughtless consumption, 
our ignoring of alternatives, and our willingness to pass off costs that 
are now the potentially most worrying drivers of greed.
9074_011.indd   236 10/20/2011   9:10:21 PM
M1
Thompson—Ethical adaptation to climate change
Rethinking Greed    237
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Allen Thompson and Jeremy Bendik-Keymer 
for their helpful advice throughout this project, and the participants 
in the Human Flourishing and Restoration in the Age of Global 
Warming conference held at Clemson University, September 2008, for 
their feedback; in particular, I am grateful to Phil Cafaro, Ned Het-
tinger, Martha Nussbaum, Matthew Pianalto, Ron Sandler, Bill Throop, 
Steven Vogel, Justin Weinberg, and Sarah Wright. Thanks also to Monica 
and Desmond Kawall, Nixie Knox, and Claire Sigsworth for helpful 
conversations.
Notes
1. Recent popular books pointing to greed as the source of significant harms 
include Hamilton and Micklethwait 2006, and Huffington 2004, among many 
others.
2. I draw this classification from Hurka 2001, chaps. 3 and 4.
3. Note that one could be greedy with respect to a single good (perhaps a 
mansion), or with respect to a set of goods (perhaps more and more shoes, or 
home electronics).
4. How would Kawall understand what Vogel (chapter 15, this volume) calls 
“alienation”? Is it the result of an “epistemic vice”?—eds.
5. What if one were to feel ashamed of one’s excessive desires for some material 
good—would this qualify as an attitude that manifests greed? We can distinguish 
between attitudes that manifest greed and those that are reactions to it; one’s 
shame would be a reaction to greed, rather than a manifestation.
6. We need not provide a firm dividing line for current purposes. A further ques-
tion that cannot be addressed fully here concerns how the value of various goods 
for an agent is determined. But notice that on any plausible theory of value there 
will be a potential gap between how an agent currently values and pursues an 
object, and the value that she ought to attribute to it. So long as there is such a 
possibility of error on the part of an agent, there is a possibility of greed on the 
current account.
7. Do these nuanced and expanded criteria of greed explain the structural wan-
tonness or inaction that Bendik-Keymer (chapter 13, this volume) or Vogel 
(chapter 15, this volume) designate?—eds.
8. Take, for example, the OED’s entry on “greedy”: “1. Having an intense 
desire or inordinate appetite for food or drink; ravenous, voracious, gluttonous. 
2. Eager for gain, wealth, and the like; avaricious, covetous, rapacious” (The 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. “greedy”). Or on “greed”: “Inordinate 
or insatiate longing, esp. for wealth; avaricious or covetous desire” (ibid., s.v. 
“greed”).
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9. In judging whether an object is excessive, considerations of justice often play 
a key role. For example, a king’s building of a palace is excessive when his sub-
jects are starving, and the resources could instead have been used to improve 
their lives. (Compare this comment with the implications of internalizing ecologi-
cal integrity into justice as Schlosberg (chapter 8, this volume) proposes.)
10. On the other hand, poverty does not preclude the possibility of greed—an 
agent living in poverty could still exploit others, or overly value and pursue goods 
that are best seen as luxuries in her circumstances.
11. Note that Kasser (2002) includes the pursuit of fame and of a good image 
in his overall account of material goods. On the other hand, many of the studies 
that he discusses focus on material goods or wealth, more narrowly construed 
(as is our focus here), and provide a plausible basis for the claims just 
presented.
12. Of course in the original doughnut case the results are far less devastating, 
but we still arrive at an unjust distribution of goods, and an unjustified thwarting 
of desires (i.e., the colleagues’ desires for something to eat).
13. For example, see Iris Marion Young’s work (2004) on a conception of politi-
cal responsibility and the discussion of her view in Thompson, chapter 10, this 
volume.—eds.
14. See Jamieson, chapter 9, this volume; Johnson 2003; and Sandler 2010. For 
discussions focusing on vegetarianism, see, for example, Nobis 2002 and Hudson 
1993.
15. Consider the issues of virtue in context discussed in the introduction and 
especially in part IV, both of this volume.—eds.
16. I attempt to consider some of these issues—of how to divide our attention 
and information gathering across morally important issues—in Kawall 2010.
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